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Courts of Many Minds
KAI SPIEKERMANN AND ROBERT E. GOODIN*
In A Constitution of Many Minds Cass Sunstein argues that the three major approaches to constitutional
interpretation – Traditionalism, Populism and Cosmopolitanism – all rely on some variation of a ‘many-
minds’ argument. Here we assess each of these claims through the lens of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. In
regard to the ﬁrst two approaches we explore the implications of sequential inﬂuence among courts (past
and foreign, respectively). In regard to the Populist approach, we consider the inﬂuence of opinion leaders.
Cass Sunstein explores three alternative approaches to constitutional interpretation in his
important recent book, A Constitution of Many Minds:
1. Traditionalists insist that if members of a society have long accepted a certain practice,
courts should be reluctant to disturb that practice.
2. Populists believe that if most people accept a certain fact or value, judges should show
a degree of humility – and respect their view in the face of reasonable doubt.
3. Cosmopolitans believe that if many nations, or many democratic nations, reject a
practice, or accept a practice, the US Supreme Court should pay respectful attention.1
All three approaches rest, as Sunstein sees it, on a common premise – the ‘many-minds’
argument of his book’s title. The thought is that, ‘if many people think something, their
view is entitled to consideration and respect’2 – not just as a matter of courtesy, but
because the more of them there are the more likely they are to be right. ‘The structure of
the central argument is identical in all three contexts,’ in that all three rest on the same
formal foundations: the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT).3 In so far as the CJT is the
mechanism underlying all three approaches to constitutional interpretation, that same
theorem should provide a formal basis for adjudicating among them. In his subsequent
discussion of those issues, Sunstein himself abjures formalism in favour of more context-
sensitive lawyer-style discussions. The aim of this article is to provide more formal
assessments of the epistemic power of those approaches, through suitable elaborations
and extensions of the CJT apparatus and related models. At the end of his book Sunstein
asks, ‘Is it possible to compare and to rank the three kinds of many minds argument?’4
His conclusion is: ‘For the United States, I have suggested that traditions are likely to
* London School of Economics (email: k.spiekermann@lse.ac.uk); Australian National University
and University of Essex, respectively. This article was presented in 2010 at the Conference on Collective
Knowledge and Epistemic Trust (Greifswald), the Annual Meeting of APSA, Washington, D.C., and the
Faculty Workshop of Harvard Law School. The authors would like to thank those audiences for many
insightful comments. They are grateful to three of the Journal’s anonymous referees who provided
instructive comments. Franz Dietrich kindly helped with some notational issues.
1 Cass R. Sunstein, A Constitution of Many Minds: Why the Founding Document Doesn’t Mean What It
Meant Before (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. ix–x.
2 Sunstein, A Constitution of Many Minds, pp. ix–x.
3 Sunstein, A Constitution of Many Mind, pp. x, 8–10.
4 Sunstein, A Constitution of Many Minds, p. 214.
provide the strongest basis for constitutional law, and that international practices provide
the weakest. Public convictions are in the middle.’ A brief reminder of the basic structure
of the CJT apparatus will be provided in the next section. Following that, we discuss
informational cascades, a problem likely to plague Traditionalism, Sunstein’s preferred
approach.5 In the next two sections, we analyse Populism and the likely fewer problems
that arise when individuals are inﬂuenced by opinion leaders.
THE CONDORCET JURY THEOREM AND ITS DEMANDING ASSUMPTIONS
Sunstein’s ‘many-minds argument’ relies on the claim that many minds are more likely to
be right than one (or just a few) mind. The most famous technical result to show the
potential of the many-minds argument is the CJT. The original version of the CJT applies
when a group of jurors decides between two alternatives with majority decision. The
following assumptions are made:
> Competence. Each juror votes for the correct alternative with probability p. 0.5.6
> Independence. The votes of the jurors are statistically independent, given the true state
of the world regarding the correct alternative.
THE CONDORCET JURY THEOREM
If Competence and Independence are met, the following hold:
Asymptotic claim. The probability of a majority of jurors being correct converges to 1 as the
number of jurors tends to inﬁnity.
Non-Asymptotic claim. The majority of a larger group of jurors is more likely to be correct than
the majority of a smaller group of jurors (provided the number of jurors is odd).
The CJT falls into two parts, the asymptotic and non-asymptotic claim. Various
generalizations and reﬁnements of the CJT have been proposed, and there has been an
extensive discussion on the plausibility of the competence and the independence assumptions.
For instance, Bernard Grofman et al. report that the CJT still holds with heterogeneous
individual competence as long as the average competence is ﬁxed and the distribution of
competences is symmetric; Franz Dietrich proves that the asymptotic part holds as long as
the average competence is above 0.5.7 Another extension is offered by Christian List and
Robert Goodin, who show that a version of the CJT can be applied to settings with more
than two alternatives.8
Most relevant for our debate are studies as to how much the independence assumption
can be relaxed while still maintaining the asymptotic or non-asymptotic part of the CJT.
Several formal approaches to relaxing the independence assumption are conceivable.9
5 Everything said there could also be applied with minor adjustments to the Cosmopolitan approach,
which we do not here discuss separately in consequence.
6 This subsumes the assumption of sincerity, which is often stated separately.
7 Bernard Grofman, Guillermo Owen and Scott L. Feld, ‘Thirteen Theorems in Search of the Truth’,
Theory and Decision, 15 (1983), 261–78; Franz Dietrich, ‘The Premises of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem Are
Not Simultaneously Justiﬁed’, Episteme, 58 (2008), 56–73.
8 Christian List and Robert E. Goodin, ‘Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury
Theorem’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 9 (2001), 277–306.
9 The inﬂuence of opinion leaders was ﬁrst studied formally by Philip J. Boland, Frank Proschan and
Y. L. Tong, ‘Modelling Dependence in Simple and Indirect Majority Systems’, Journal of Applied Probability,
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Apart from the question of whether Competence and Independence hold in reality and
what follows theoretically if they are relaxed, there is also the more fundamental issue as to
whether we can simultaneously know both assumptions to be justiﬁed. Dietrich has recently
shown that this is impossible:10 if one knows that the votes are independent, one cannot
know the competence of the jurors, and if one knows the jurors are competent one cannot
justify the assumptions that their votes are independent.11 Dietrich proposes to develop new
jury theorems with more realistic premises.12 In this article, we do not attempt to offer a new
jury theorem, but we show various ways in which Independence can be undermined in
practice and how results based on dependent votes differ from the (often rather fantastic)
results of the classical CJT. This suggests that Sunstein’s casual reliance on the CJT causes
more problems for him than he may have imagined and that his own preference for
Traditionalism is in need of some important qualiﬁcations. Populism may be a more
attractive alternative, but it also faces potentially serious problems.
TRADITIONALISM AND CASCADES
The original CJT set-up assumes that voters are making decisions either simultaneously with
one another, or in ignorance of or in indifference to what other voters have done. The
Traditionalist approach to constitutional interpretation envisages something very different.
There, courts are making their decisions sequentially, not simultaneously. Furthermore, if
they are Traditionalists, subsequent courts make their decisions not only in knowledge of but
also in deference to earlier courts’ decisions. That changes things dramatically.
In our model of Traditionalism we assume that different judges have to decide on the
same dichotomous question at different points in time. Each judge has an independent
and symmetric private signal of equal reliability as to which of the two alternatives is the
correct one. We also assume that this signal is more likely to point to the correct
alternative than the incorrect alternative, analogous to the competence assumption in the
CJT. Suppose that judges care only about getting their decision right in the current case.13
(F’note continued)
26 (1989), 81–8. Krishna Ladha has worked extensively on the effect of correlated votes, where correlation is
due to shared information, particularly in Krishna K. Ladha, ‘The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech,
and Correlated Votes’, American Journal of Political Science, 36 (1992), 617–34; Krishna K. Ladha,
‘Condorcet’s Jury Theorem in Light of De Finetti’s Theorem’, Social Choice and Welfare, 10 (1993), 69–85;
Krishna K. Ladha, ‘Information Pooling through Majority-Rule Voting: Condorcet’s Jury Theorem with
Correlated Votes’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 26 (1995), 353–72. This idea was extended
and developed into a new jury theorem by Franz Dietrich and Christian List, ‘A Model of Jury Decisions
where All Jurors Have the Same Evidence’, Synthese, 142 (2004), 175–202, assuming that all jurors have the
same evidence. Serguei Kaniovski, ‘Aggregation of Correlated Votes and Condorcet’s Jury Theorem’, Theory
and Decision, 69 (2010), 453–68, has recently shown that a (pairwise) correlation table is not sufﬁcient to
determine the existing dependence relations between jurors and that different ways to instantiate the same
pairwise correlations lead to different results.
10 Dietrich, ‘The Premises of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem Are Not Simultaneously Justiﬁed’.
11 With the exception of highly construed examples where it is known that both assumptions hold in
virtue of the construction.
12 A general account of the causal bases of dependence leading to a new jury theorem is presented in Franz
Dietrich and Kai Spiekermann, ‘Epistemic Democracy with Defensible Premises’ (unpublished manuscript,
2010, available at http://personal.lse.ac.uk/spiekerk/papers/DietrichSpiekermann-EpistemicDemocracy.pdf).
13 Among other things, they are not concerned with how their current decision might inﬂuence future
judgements.
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Then each judge has to form his or her decision by considering her own private signal and
the history of votes. The history of votes is mutual knowledge.
It is well known that such set-ups can cause the problem of informational cascades.
There can be histories of votes that constitute such strong evidence in favour of one
alternative that all judges will always follow the evidence of the history and never vote
according to their own private signal. If that happens, an informational cascade has
begun. Judges will have stopped learning from their own signals and will blindly follow
the judgement the historic voting record suggests. Informational cascades are a problem
because the informational base on which all future judgements are grounded can be
very thin.14
The literature on informational cascades has grown rapidly and has by now resulted in
all sorts of technical reﬁnements that we will not address in this article. The seminal
contribution is provided by Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer and Ivo Welch
(henceforth: BHW).15 A very simple set-up, roughly in line with the model introduced by
BHW, sufﬁces to clarify the problem with the many-minds argument based on sequential
judgements.16 In our treatment, unlike BHW and others, we will not always model judges
as fully Bayesian rational. In particular, we want to maintain the possibility that judges
can be irrationally overconﬁdent about their own private signal, or that they vote
according to their private signal as a matter of principle.17
This presumption of ‘bounded rationality’ makes room for assumptions that may
ultimately be more realistic, both in general and particularly for the case at hand, than full
Bayesian rationality. We know from experimental psychology that, while people generally
update their beliefs in the direction indicated by Bayes’s formula, they do so far more
slowly than Bayesian rationality requires. ‘A convenient ﬁrst approximation to the data
would say that it takes anywhere from two to ﬁve observations to do [what by Bayes’s
formula should be] one observation’s worth of work in inducing a subject to change his
opinions,’ one researcher reports.18 With regard to judges, evidence suggests that they are
much more likely to hold on to their own view than to defer to majorities. One landmark
14 This is what Adrian Vermeule, Law and the Limits of Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009), pp. 5–6, see also pp. 75–7, calls the ‘Burkean Paradox’: ‘Where actors defer to the information of
past others, as the Burkean position would have them do, the result is a low-value ‘‘information cascade’’
rather than collective wisdom.’
15 Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer and Ivo Welch, ‘A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and
Cultural Change as Informational Cascades’, Journal of Political Economy, 100 (1992), 992–1026.
Similarly, Abhijit V. Banerjee, ‘A Simple Model of Herd Behavior’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107
(1992), 797–817; and Lones Smith and Peter Sorensen, ‘Pathological Outcomes of Observational
Learning’, Econometrica, 68 (2000), 371–98; a useful introduction is Christophe P. Chamley, Rational
Herds: Economic Models of Social Learning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
16 Note the contrast between the literature on cascades and on sequential voting games, as analysed in a
seminal paper by E. Dekel and M. Piccione, ‘Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary
Elections’, Journal of Political Economy, 108 (2000), 34–55. The cascade literature suggests that the utility
of voters is derived purely from their own court’s decision in the case at hand, while voting games relate
individual utility to the overall outcome of all actions by all agents.
17 Of course, this could be done in a Bayesian framework by changing the utility functions of the
judges. But the Bayesian treatment comes with some algebraic costs and little gain for the purposes of this
article.
18 Ward Edwards, ‘Conservatism in Human Information Processing’, in Benjamin Kleinmuntz, ed.,
Formal Representation of Human Judgement (New York: Wiley, 1968); reprinted in Daniel Kahneman,
Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky, eds, Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 359–69.
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study of the US Supreme Court reports that justices vote in line with their own
preferences (operationalized as ‘the same way they voted on the last such cases’) rather
than with precedent (operationalized as ‘the way the majority voted in the past case’) in
an astonishing 90.8 per cent of cases.19
Modelling Court Decisions and Cascades
At each point in time t (t5 0, 1, 2,y), there is a court of k judges. The current
judges decide simultaneously between two alternatives. The judges on the court change
each time period, so that no judge votes on an issue twice. A judge’s decision is labelled
by time in the superscript and by the label of the judge at that time (1,y, k), which
appears as a subscript. Thus, the decision of judge i at time t is vti . There is a state of the
world such that either y5 1 or y5 0 is factually true, and this state does not change over
time. Each judge i at time t receives a private signal Sti 2 0; 1f g about the state of the
world. For simplicity, we assume that these signals are of equal quality for all judges, that
they are better than random and that the two alternatives are treated symmetrically,
such that:
PrðSti ¼ 1 y ¼ 1j Þ ¼ PrðSti ¼ 0 y ¼ 0j Þ ¼ p40:5;
for all t5 1, 2,y and i5 1, 2,y, k. For each judge, the decision as to which alternative he
votes for is based on his own private signal, and the history of previous judgements, ht21.
In other words, a judge’s judgement function maps the history ht21 of all previous
judgements and the judge’s private signal Sti onto a decision to vote for 0 or 1:
vti : ðht1; Sti Þ ! 0; 1f g
Decision functions can take different shapes. For illustration, consider the classic
starting example presented by BHW.20 There, courts are of size k5 1. The ﬁrst judge will
vote in line with her private signal. All subsequent judges know the complete history and
their own private signal. They calculate their degree of belief by Bayesian updating. As
soon as the absolute margin of votes is 2 or greater, each judge will vote for the opinion with
more support regardless of their own signal because the support from two or more other
judges outweighs the (potentially contrary) evidence of one’s own private signal. Therefore, a
cascade starts to run very quickly, and the cascade will often settle for the wrong alternative.
The implicit decision function in the basic BHWmodel is: take all historic votes and add your
own private signal as another vote; then back the majority winner.21
19 Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, ‘The Inﬂuence of Stare Decisis on the Votes of United States
Supreme Court Justices’, American Journal of Political Science, 40 (1996), 971–1003.
20 In the BHW model, one individual decides at each point in time (i.e. k5 1). The state of the world is
ﬁxed randomly at the start with equal probability, and all judges begin with the same prior of
p(y5 1)5p(y5 0)5 0.5. The utility function of judges is deﬁned such that a correct decision yields
payoff 1, an incorrect decision 0:
uðv; yÞ ¼ 1 if v ¼ y
0 otherwise:

The judges maximize their utility, and here this means they vote for the alternative that they consider
more likely to be correct.
21 Different modelling choices are conceivable to break ties, especially randomizing or assuming that
judges have marginally more conﬁdence in their own signal than in other judgements.
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This decision rule is Bayesian rational under the BHW set-up. It is also quite intuitive:
since all judges are equally competent, the alternative with more private signals in favour
of it is more likely to be correct and, therefore, judges should vote for it. But there
are other decision functions that are likely to occur in reality. For example, a judge
could always vote in line with his own signal. Or a judge might succumb to the historic
majority only if it reaches a certain higher threshold. Or judges could have a limited
memory or a limited willingness to incorporate decisions that lie far in the past. One could
model this within a Bayesian framework by assuming that such judges have mistaken
beliefs about the distribution of competence in a society, or one could assume that these
judges have utility functions that represent not only an interest in getting the decision
right but also in voting according to some procedural conditions. But a simpler and often
more plausible way to model these different decision functions is to assume that these
judges simply follow heuristics that are not Bayesian rational. Judges may partly be
driven by normative considerations or by the desire for expressive voting. Thus, we will
work with simple, not necessarily Bayesian rational, decision functions in the remainder
of this article.
What happens if we allow for multi-member courts with k. 1? As is well known
from the game-theoretic literature on votes in multi-member panels and courts, this
question in principle allows for subtle and sophisticated strategic analyses.22 Again, we
propose to simplify matters. We assume that judges care only about getting their own
vote in the case at hand right, and take other observed votes to be informative, i. e. in line
with private signals. A more careful analysis of the strategic subtleties has to wait for
another day. Yet again, in practice, given that judges have limited insight into the
preferences and beliefs of their predecessors and peers, this assumption of non-strategic
behaviour may not be unreasonable, as sophisticated strategic considerations would
require a much richer knowledge of the decision environment than we would expect in
real-world settings.
With these preliminaries out of the way, we can state how we model the judges’
decisions (pseudo code to illustrate the way the model has been programmed is provided
in the supplementary material y1). We consider a very simple class of decision functions
for judges, which can be described by just two parameters: the length of their memory, m,
and the weight they give to their own private signal, w.23 The length of memory
determines how many previous decisions are taken into account. If m5 0, the judge only
takes his own signal into account. The weight of their own signal is a natural number that
speciﬁes, in effect, how many votes the judge allocates to himself when considering his
private signal and all previous decisions he considers. For instance, in a one-member
court, if w is large (.m) the judge will vote on the basis of his or her own private signal
alone. If w5 1 and m5 2, then the judge will vote against his or her own private signal if
and only if both previous judges have voted against it. If w5 2 and m5 3, then the judge
22 David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks, ‘Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the
Condorcet Jury Theorem’, American Political Science Review, 90 (1996), 34–45; Timothy Feddersen
and Wolfgang Pesendorfer, ‘Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under
Strategic Voting’, American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 23–35.
23 We have already reported psychological evidence that empirically w may well be larger than 1. For
similar evidence that m may be limited, see, for example, Yaacov Trope, ‘Inferences of Personal
Characteristics on the Basis of Information Retrieved from One’s Memory’, Journal of Personality &
Social Psychology, 36 (1978), 93–106; reprinted in Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, Judgement under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.
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will vote against his or her own private signal if and only if all three previous judges have
voted against it.24 More generally, judges decide as follows:
1. Count all previous votes for the two alternatives that are in the reach of memory, m.
2. Add w votes to the votes for the alternative indicated by private signal, Sti .
3. Vote for the alternative with more votes. If tied, vote according to own signal Sti .
25
Homogeneous Judges
We have run computer simulations to determine the epistemic competence of courts
voting in sequence. The courts decide by majority vote, and (unless stated otherwise) we
assume courts consist of nine judges (k5 9). We usually consider 200 time periods. Since
the private signals judges receive are stochastic, one needs to determine the average group
competence across many runs. Our results are based on the averaging of 1,000 runs each.
We assume a reliability of individual signals of p5 0.55.
In the ﬁrst scenario, all judges have maximal memory and assign a weight of 1 to their
own private signal. Figure 1 shows the average competence the courts have at each point
in time. The ﬁrst court (without any history available) has a competence in line with the
Condorcet Jury Theorem with p5 0.55 and n5 9, which leads to a group competence of
0.621. The group competence rises for the subsequent courts because these courts can
draw on previous decisions. However, cascades arise very quickly because all later judges
will vote with the historic majority as soon as an absolute margin of 2 or more arises.
After a certain point, an informational cascade of the same sort that Sunstein worries
0 50 100 150 200
t0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Pr
Fig. 1. Average group competence dependent on time in 1,000 simulations with k5 9, and judges with m5 20
and w5 1
24 In the case of multi-member courts, these calculations would have to be expressed as margins of all
previous votes. See also supplementary material y1.
25 This is one way of formalizing Vermeule’s suggestion that ‘individual judges might adopt an
intermediate approach, according to which they give some but not complete deference to the views of the
past, and correlatively think for themselves to some degree or in some circumstances.’ See Vermeule,
Law and the Limits of Reason, p. 76.
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about with the Populist approach sets in.26 Then, instead of ‘many-minds’ we merely have
‘many-mimics’, which confer no epistemic advantage (Figure 1).
The emergence of cascades is delayed if the judges assign a higher weight to their own
signal. Figure 2 shows group competence for weights 3, 10 and 50, while all other
parameters remain unchanged. Two effects can be observed. On the one hand, increasing
the weight increases the group competence to which the courts converge after sufﬁcient
time. On the other, a higher weight delays the convergence and indeed the improvement in
group competence (both effects being greater the greater the weight). Both effects are due
to the fact that cascades arise later, and decisions are therefore based on more private
signals, which improves the epistemic performance for the later votes. Judges who are
very self-conﬁdent about the quality of their own signal will persist in revealing their own
signals and avoid cascades for longer. This increases the epistemic performance of later
courts. It is this kind of situation in which Sunstein’s many-minds argument gets more
traction. Ironically, these settings require that the judges are ‘stubborn’ about their own
votes and slow to follow the many-minds of others.
These results suggest that the many-minds argument has to be treated with care when
the voting is sequential, which is the case for both Traditionalism and (to a certain extent)
for Cosmopolitanism. If judges are quite responsive to the opinions of their predecessors,
they can quickly trigger cascades, compromising the capacity for many minds to enhance
group competence. If they are more likely to reveal their own private signal in their
decision because they are less responsive to previous judgements, they are not using the
previous decisions to improve their own vote, but later judgements can beneﬁt because
early cascades are prevented and the information from more independent assessors is
taken into account.
The upshot of this analysis is clear. The only way in which courts composed of
homogeneous judges will be able to achieve any substantial epistemic advantage over
courts that pay too much attention to their predecessors is by judges attaching very little
w = 50
w = 10
w = 3
0 50 100 150 200
t0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Pr
Fig. 2. Average group competence dependent on time in 1,000 simulations with k5 9, and judges with
m5 200 and different levels of w
26 Sunstein, A Constitution of Many Minds, pp. 103–6, 171–3.
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importance to the judgements of previous judges, relative to their own. That is to say,
judges would have stubbornly to stick with their own views in the face of a very
substantial body of traditional evidence in the opposite direction. In short, in this
scenario, achieving the epistemic power of the many-minds would require judges largely
to resist tradition rather than bowing to it.
Judges Who Distinguish between Informative and Cascade Votes
So far we have assumed that judges can observe only the votes of their predecessors, but not
the reasons why their predecessors voted as they did. This led to a dilemma. A judge has only
one vote with which to perform two different tasks: on the one hand, reveal his private signal
and, on the other, aggregate the votes that have taken place previously.
The situation could be improved if these two tasks were separated through a division of
labour. Using this approach, some judges reveal their private signals, while others vote to
aggregate the signals that have been revealed so far. However, for this division of labour to
work it is necessary that the aggregators distinguish between informative votes and aggregated
(cascade) votes. Judges serving as aggregators must know whether any given predecessor voted
the way she did because she was following her own signal, or because she was following the
majority of past decisions. It is not unrealistic to assume judges would know this, however: since
judges can read the opinions of previous judges, they can determine whether their predecessors
have voted with the traditional majority or whether they have voted in line with their own
independent reasoning. A neat distinction may be difﬁcult in practice, but judges should at
least have some indication of who the independent voices among their predecessors were.
For this set-up, we hypothesize a heterogeneous court. Some judges on that court always
reveal their private signals. Other judges on that court (indeed, we hypothesize, a majority of
judges on the court) make their votes as in our ﬁrst set-up by pooling their private signal
with the votes of judges on previous panels.27 But – and this is the crucial difference between
this set-up and the last – we assume that, in so pooling, current judges take account of only
the votes of previous judges who voted on the basis of their own private signals. That is to
say, these ‘discriminating’ judges vote on the basis of previous judges’ votes only when those
votes are truly ‘informative’ and not merely the product of an informational cascade.
Our simulation is based on courts consisting of four informative judges who always vote
purely in line with their own signal, and ﬁve judges who give a weight of 1 to their own signal
and consider previous votes, but only those of the informative judges. Figure 3 reveals that
these heterogeneous courts perform remarkably well after some time. The set-up with
heterogeneous judges who can discriminate between informative and uninformative votes
improves the epistemic performance of the group over time because the judges practise the
described division of labour. The informative judges provide evidence, the other judges
aggregate that evidence.
As revealed by Figure 3, the probability that such a court will reach the correct decision
does not plateau. Instead, it continues to increase the more previous courts there have
been that have to be taken into account. The group competence approaches 1 rather
slowly. After taking into account ﬁfty previous courts, the probability of the majority of
the current court reaching the correct decision is only around PrE 0.90, and after 100 is
27 Vermeule anticipates this part of our model, but not the next, when writing, ‘Perhaps some judges in
the stream of precedent or tradition have contributed independently, while some have not’. See Vermeule,
Law and the Limits of Reason, p. 76.
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still only around PrE 0.95. By the time 200 previous courts have been taken into account,
however, a correct decision is virtually certain. Furthermore, with courts that are
heterogeneous in this way, the probability of a correct decision is a much more rapidly
increasing function of the number of previous courts than it is with homogeneous courts
with very stubborn judges (e.g. w5 50 in Figure 2).
Here, then, is a second way the Traditionalist argument might work. Judges on
heterogeneous courts can improve their chances of reaching correct decisions by taking
into account the decisions of previous judges, provided they do so in this very particular
way. But note well the irony. Traditionalist courts of this sort beneﬁt epistemically only
from judges taking account of the votes of previous judges who were not themselves
Traditionalists and who voted purely on the basis their own private signal rather than on
the basis of the history of votes before them.
This result and the previous one can be interpreted in different ways. One can take them
as starting points for an empirical analysis of the functioning of courts: To what extent do
judges consider previous judgements? And do they distinguish between colleagues who
vote with the tradition and those who do not? Our ﬁndings clearly indicate the importance
of further research on those questions by students of judicial politics. The last result can
also be taken as a starting point for a normative argument in favour of diversity in courts.
We have seen that the epistemic performance of a court is poor if all judges primarily
follow the judgements of their predecessors. But the epistemic performance is also quite
poor if they do not consider past results at all. A mix is needed that takes past results into
account without suppressing the use of independent judgements entirely. Diverse courts
are likely to be better placed in that regard.
Traditionalism and Cosmopolitanism Share the Same Problem
So far we have explored the issue of informational cascades purely in relation to
Traditionalist courts. Notice that the same problems arise with Cosmopolitan courts as
well, however, in so far as decisions there too being typically (if not necessarily exclusively)
sequential in form. Just as there is no reason to suppose that your own court is the very ﬁrst
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Fig. 3. Average group competence dependent on time in 1,000 simulations with k5 9 and two types of judges:
four informative voters with either m5 0 or w. 1,800, and ﬁve discriminating judges who only aggregate
previous informative votes with m5 200 and w5 1
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one to take a Traditionalist stance towards its interpretive task, so too there is no reason to
suppose that your own court is the very ﬁrst one to take a Cosmopolitan stance towards its
interpretive task. Yet, if the foreign courts from which Cosmopolitan judges borrow
themselves have simply borrowed from other, earlier foreign courts, then once again we could
easily have a case not of ‘many-minds’ but merely of ‘many-mimics’. In extremis, all the
foreign courts from which you are borrowing might themselves have borrowed (either directly
or at several removes) from one and the same Ur-court that set the very ﬁrst precedent that
then got picked up in all subsequent decisions across all the different jurisdictions.
There are, of course, various other problems in implementing a Cosmopolitan approach
to constitutional interpretation. One among them, obviously, is determining which foreign
jurisdictions are good comparators to your own.28 To all those problems, we add another:
both Traditionalism and Cosmopolitanism are in any case seriously compromised by the
risk of informational cascades that is endemic to both, in so far as both involve sequential
decision processes.
POPULISM AND OPINION LEADERS
In A Constitution of Many Minds, Sunstein suggests that one way to apply the many-minds
argument in legal theory is to embrace Populism, which is to say, follow the judgements of the
majority of the population when deciding on fundamental legal principles and values. Once
again, the formal framework Sunstein relies on, without spelling out the details, is the CJT.29
If the CJT was applicable without qualiﬁcations, the majority of the population should be
almost infallible as long as each individual is at least somewhat more competent than a coin
toss. However, there are good reasons to believe that the CJT is not that applicable.
In his discussion of Populism, Sunstein suggests that constitutional courts should check
and potentially revise their judgements if they experience a ‘public backlash’.30 Thus,
‘intense public opposition is a clue’ that the court got a decision wrong.31 Of course,
Sunstein also observes that the public can get things badly wrong: ‘We have seen that if a
systematic bias is present, the majority will not be right. If most people think that free
trade is bad, even though it is (usually) good, governments will do badly if they follow the
view of most people.’32 Sunstein mentions the negative role of cascades, which undermine
the independence of voters, and he discusses the problem of cascades induced by ‘meaning
entrepreneurs’.33 Overall, Sunstein is quite sceptical of judges being able to distinguish
28 There is an analogous problem, perhaps, in determining as a Traditionalist which past precedents
are relevantly similar to the case before your current court (Vermeule, Law and the Limits of Reason,
pp. 71–2).
29 Sunstein, A Constitution of Many Minds, p. 136, chap. 7.
30 Sunstein, A Constitution of Many Minds, p. 125.
31 Sunstein, A Constitution of Many Minds, p. 165, Sunstein’s emphasis. We are puzzled by Sunstein’s
proviso that Populism should only look for ‘intense public opposition’. To see that this statement does not
make much sense in a CJT context, it sufﬁces to consider two examples: (1) assume competence and
independence hold, but each single voter is not very competent (p5 0.51, for instance). In a large
population, the majority is very likely to be right, but the result is also very likely to be tight (an expected
51 per cent versus 49 per cent); (2) assume the voters are heavily inﬂuenced by one opinion leader taking
the incorrect stance. The incorrect stance wins by a landslide. These two examples show that the size of the
majority alone should not make us more comfortable to accept an outcome. Without knowing that the
independence assumption holds, the size of the majority does not tell us much.
32 Sunstein, A Constitution of Many Minds, p. 169.
33 Sunstein, A Constitution of Many Minds, p. 172.
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between situations in which the CJT applies, and situations in which a violation of the
independence or competence condition renders the CJT inapplicable.34
We agree with Sunstein’s assessment that the independence condition is of the
most severe concern.35 In this section we explore the implications of violating the
independence condition in one speciﬁc way: by introducing opinion leaders inﬂuencing
the population. We ﬁnd support for Sunstein’s scepticism regarding Populism, in that even
moderate levels of inﬂuence by one or a few opinion leaders can seriously distort results.
However, in a more diverse society with multiple opinion leaders, this effect is mitigated.
In this section, we start with one opinion leader and then move on to modelling the inﬂuence
of multiple opinion leaders with and without correlation between them.
One Opinion Leader
Many different mechanisms to induce correlation between votes, and thereby violate the
independence condition, are conceivable. We begin with a simple and politically highly
relevant constellation: all voters are equally inﬂuenced by the stance of one opinion
leader. This opinion leader could be a politically opinionated television broadcaster,
a newspaper or an inﬂuential public ﬁgure. Such a scenario was ﬁrst discussed formally
by Boland et al.36
The opinion leader has competence p^ (we signify all variables regarding the opinion
leader with a hat), which is the probability that the opinion leader adopts the correct
position. The opinion leader does not vote, but inﬂuences his followers among the voters.
Voters follow the opinion leader (i.e. adopt his position) with probability p. If a voter
does not follow the opinion leader, she has competence p to vote for the correct
alternative, similar to the standard CJT set-up. A positive probability-of-following p
induces positive correlation between the position of the opinion leader and the vote of
each follower,37 and also among the votes of all the followers themselves, so that the
independence assumption of the CJT no longer holds.
Figure 4 shows the effect of various levels of probability-of-following p on the group
competence, i.e. the probability that a majority of voters is correct. We set p^ ¼ 0:6 and
p5 0.55. The result for p5 0 shows the normal asymptotic CJT result – the group
competence tends to 1 with increasing group size. With a slight opinion-leader inﬂuence of
p5 0.05 the asymptotic result still holds, but the speed of the convergence is diminished.
For higher levels of probability-of-following (Figure 4 displays results for p5 0.1 and 0.2)
the group competence increases ﬁrst as the group size increases, but then converges
towards the competence of the opinion leader p^ ¼ 0:6.
The important upshot of this result is that even moderate levels of opinion leader
inﬂuence can derail the CJT result. If the voters are p5 0.55 competent and at least one in
34 Sunstein, A Constitution of Many Minds, p. 175.
35 Most worries about the competence condition, as in David M. Estlund, Democratic Authority: A
Philosophical Framework (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 225–8, are in our view
best seen as really worries about independence. All that the CJT requires by way of competence, recall, is
that voters be ‘better than random’; and how could they be worse than random, except by some common
inﬂuences that systematically affect many voters at once, thus violating the independence assumption?
36 Boland, Proschan and Tong, ‘Modelling Dependence in Simple and Indirect Majority Systems’.
37 However, the probability-of-following is not usually identical with the correlation coefﬁcient, as we
discuss in the supplementary material y2. In this regard we develop a different technical treatment from
that of Boland et al. In other respects our set-up is very similar to theirs.
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ten follows the opinion leader, the group competence converges towards the competence
of the opinion leader, and not 1. The exact threshold where the CJT breaks can easily be
determined (see supplementary material y2). The group competence converges to p^ rather
than to 1 if:
p4
p0:5
p
;
and to (p^þ 1)/2 for p5 (p20.5)/2. For Figure 4 the threshold is (0.5520.5)/0.55E 0.091.
The result also shows that the higher the voters’ individual competence, the more robust
are the CJT results, in the sense that a higher probability-of-following is needed to
overturn them.
Two Opposed Opinion Leaders
The previous section suggests that the inﬂuence of one opinion leader, if sufﬁciently
strong, can have deleterious consequences for the group competence. But assuming the
presence of just one opinion leader is unrealistically pessimistic. A pluralistic society is
more likely to have several opinion leaders, and one can hope that biases in different
directions will be less bad than the uncountered inﬂuence of just one opinion leader.
We assume that each opinion leader j has a competence p^j, which is the probability that
she will support the correct position. Each voter is inﬂuenced by exactly one opinion
leader, and each opinion leader has nj potential followers. Within each group there is a
probability, pj, that voters within that group will adopt the view of the opinion leader.
We start by considering an extreme case: two opinion leaders with perfectly negative
correlation between them. This is a model for ‘hyper-partisan’ politics where a society is
inﬂuenced by two opinion leaders with diametrically opposed positions. Table 1 compares
the results for different levels of the probability-of-following p and for two different
partitions of the population.38 In the ﬁrst case we consider an almost equal split of 501
and 500 group members. In the second case, we give the ﬁrst opinion leader 701 followers,
and the second opinion leader 300 followers. As before, we assume the voters have
n (log scale)
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Fig. 4. The inﬂuence of one opinion leader on the group competence dependent on group size for various
levels of probability-of-following, for odd n only
38 Supplementary material y3 provides an analytical result for group competence in this setting.
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competence p5 0.55 if they are not inﬂuenced by their opinion leader. The ﬁrst opinion
leader has competence p^1 ¼ 0:6. Since the two opinion leaders are perfectly negatively
correlated, the second opinion leader has competence p^2 ¼ 0:4.
If the voters do not follow their opinion leaders at all (p5 0), the result is simply the
CJT result for p5 0.55 and n5 1,001. If the voters always follow their respective opinion
leader, the opinion leader commanding the majority (i.e. the ﬁrst opinion leader)
determines the vote, and the group competence boils down to his competence. However,
for other positive but not perfect levels of opinion leader inﬂuence, we can make two
observations:
1. For group partition (501, 500) the group competence is higher if the two opinion
leaders are perfectly negatively correlated, compared to the result without correlation,
particularly at higher values of p (compare the top row of Table 1 with the second row
of Table 2).
2. The group competence is higher if the two perfectly negatively correlated opinion
leaders have more similar-sized groups of followers (compare the top with the bottom
row of Table 1).
While we do not offer a formal proof here, the mechanism behind this result is easy to
grasp. Negative correlation leads to non-independent votes that ‘cancel each other out’,
and it does so more completely where the groups are of similar size. For instance, when
the partition is (501, 500) and the probability-of-following is 0.5, around 250 voters are
expected to vote in one direction as followers of the ﬁrst opinion leader, and since the two
opinion leaders are 100 per cent negatively correlated, around 250 voters are expected to
vote in the other direction as followers of the second opinion leader. These votes cancel
each other out. The remaining voters (around 500) vote according to their private signal
with competence 0.55. The result is, therefore, very likely to be correct, almost as likely as
if the decision were taken purely by a group of 500 independent voters each having
individual competence of 0.55.39
This cancelling effect is compromised, however, the more disparate the size of the
groups. In the second row of Table 1, 701 voters are potential followers of the ﬁrst
opinion leader and 300 are potential followers of the second opinion leader. If the
probability-of-following in each group is 0.5 once again, there will be around 350 people
following the ﬁrst opinion leader, and around 150 voting the opposite way, following the
second opinion leader. That leaves around 500 independent voters voting according to
TABLE 1 Group Competence: Two Perfectly Negatively Correlated Opinion Leaders
Probability-of-following p
Group partition 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.75 1
501, 500 0.999 0.998 0.995 0.990 0.967 0.886 0.600
701, 300 0.999 0.976 0.799 0.620 0.600 0.600 0.600
Note: The ﬁrst opinion leader has competence p^1 ¼ 0:6, the other p^2 ¼ 0:4. If voters are not
following the opinion leader they have competence 0.55.
39 For comparison: the CJT result for n5 500 and p5 0.55 is 0.986.
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their private signal with individual competence of 0.55, once again. But in this case, it also
leaves around 200 voters voting the way the ﬁrst opinion leader indicates whose votes are
not cancelled out by votes of people following the second opinion leader. This reduces the
group competence, as these 200 uncancelled voters have a probability of 0.4 to vote
incorrectly, in which case the independent voters are unlikely to overrule them.40
Uncorrelated Opinion Leaders
Another interesting setting with multiple opinion leaders arises if the opinion leaders are
many, and they are mutually uncorrelated. Analytical results for multiple opinion leaders
become increasingly unwieldy. For this reason we rely primarily on Monte Carlo
numerical simulations to estimate the group competence in settings with multiple opinion
leaders (see supplementary material y3).
Table 2 shows the results. We keep the total number of voters constant at n5 1,001, but
change the number of opinion leaders (column 1) and the respective almost equal sizes of
the groups of voters that they inﬂuence (column 2). The competence of all opinion leaders
is assumed to be p^ ¼ 0:6, that of voters (if they do not follow the opinion leader) p5 0.55.
The results for just one opinion leader are as discussed above for that case. Moderate to
high levels of probability-of-following will lead group competence to converge to that of
the opinion leader, i.e. 0.6. It is also unsurprising that no inﬂuence of opinion leaders
(p5 0) leads to the normal CJT result for 1,001 jurors, which is about 0.999. When the
groups follow their respective opinion leaders with certainty (p5 1), the results can be
determined with some simple combinatorial calculations, calculating the probability of a
correct majority among the opinion leaders.
The principal ﬁnding in Table 2 is that, as a general rule, more opinion leaders tend to
result in higher group competence.41 To see the general tendency of increasing group
competence with more opinion leaders, compare, for instance, the group competence
arising from the set-up with three opinion leaders with the set-up with eleven opinion
leaders. In Table 2, we see that eleven opinion leaders yield greater group competence for
all positive levels of probability-of-following. This is unsurprising. What drives these
TABLE 2 Group Competence and Multiple Opinion Leaders
No. of opinion
Probability-of-following p
leaders Group partition 0* 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.75 1*
1* 1,001 0.999 0.750 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.600
2* 501, 500 0.999 0.899 0.838 0.835 0.824 0.784 0.600
3 333, 334, 334 0.999 0.95 0.84 0.70 0.65 0.65 0.648
5 13 201, 43 200 0.999 0.98 0.90 0.83 0.69 0.68 0.683
11 113 91 0.999 0.99 0.96 0.91 0.84 0.76 0.753
Note: All p^i ¼ 0:6 and p5 0.55. Rows and columns marked with * show analytical results; all
other results are based on Monte Carlo simulations. All analytical results are rounded to three
digits, all Monte Carlo estimates to two digits.
40 How this constellation affects group competence in general depends on p, p^ and the group partition.
41 The results for the setting with two opinion leaders represent an anomaly that we will discuss below.
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results is the tendency for opinion leaders to pull in different directions and thus ‘cancel’
each other out according to the law of large numbers, and for more opinion leaders to
provide more independent points of judgement.
In the most extreme case, when there are as many opinion leaders as voters, and the
opinion leaders are not more competent than a coin toss (p5 0.5), we expect the opinion
leaders to be about equally split in their support for the two alternatives. Consequently,
the votes caused by the opinion leaders will also tend to be equally split. Therefore, the
votes caused by the opinion leaders tend to cancel, and the votes of those whose votes
were independent of any opinion leader decide the result. As long as there are enough
independent votes, the group competence will be high. Obviously, when the opinion
leaders are better than random they tend to cause more correct votes, improving the
results further.42 However, for smaller numbers of opinion leaders, or if opinion leaders
have differential numbers of followers, the cancellation effect is less reliable.
In addition, from the discussion above we know that the competence of a group with
one opinion leader converges towards the competence of the opinion leader as the group
size increases if p. (p20.5)/p. In the limit (p5 1) there are just as many independent
points of judgement as there are opinion leaders. Since more independent judgements are
better than fewer, more opinion leaders lead to better results.
Cases with two opinion leaders present something of an anomaly. There, group
competence is persistently high even for relatively high probabilities-of-following. That is
purely because the majority will typically not be wrong unless both opinion leaders are
wrong, which is quite rare. By contrast, in a group with three opinion leaders the majority
will typically be wrong if either two or three of them are wrong, which happens more
frequently. This is why the results with two opinion leaders yield higher levels of group
competence even for relatively high probabilities-of-following.
Two striking conclusions emerge from this analysis. The ﬁrst conclusion is that, in general,
it is epistemically better to have more opinion leaders rather than fewer if we have to have
opinion leaders at all. The second conclusion is that having just two opinion leaders with an
almost equal number of followers is epistemically pretty good across most of the range of
possible probabilities-of-following; and where the probability-of-following is relatively high it
takes a moderately high number of opinion leaders to beat the epistemic performance of an
electorate with just two opinion leaders and an almost equal number of followers.
POPULISM RECONSIDERED
Is Populism preferable to Traditionalism and Cosmopolitanism from an epistemic point
of view? The answer to this question depends very much on the setting of the parameters.
If voters were both competent and independent in their votes, then increasing the number
of voters as much as possible is epistemically a good idea. But the independence assumption is
not likely to hold. The inﬂuence of opinion leaders, in particular, undermines independence
(other mechanisms, too, are conceivable and have been discussed).
With regard to opinion leaders, the message is mixed. On the negative side, having a
single opinion leader who is even moderately inﬂuential can severely reduce the epistemic
performance of a group. The same is true if several opinion leaders pull in the same
42 This less extreme case is the more realistic one, of course: it is hard to think why people would follow
opinion leaders unless they at least believed (perhaps wrongly of course) that the opinion leader’s opinion
was more likely to be correct than their own.
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direction (that is, are positively correlated). On the positive side, having negatively
correlated or a great many uncorrelated opinion leaders causes much smaller reductions
in epistemic performance, even if they are quite inﬂuential on voters.43 One reason this is
true with uncorrelated leaders may be akin to the mechanism discussed among negatively
correlated ones: the effects of uncorrelated opinion leaders (roughly) cancel. Given
enough diversity among opinion leaders and voters who are not following their opinion
leaders too blindly, relatively good epistemic outcomes can still be expected.
Another effect should be taken into account when evaluating the epistemic effects of
opinion leaders – the surprisingly positive effect of polarization. If two opinion leaders are
highly polarized (i.e. highly negatively correlated) and if they have about the same
numbers of followers, then their inﬂuence tends to cancel each other out, and the
remaining, independent votes tend to arrive at the correct conclusion. This suggests that
political polarization, however undesirable in other respects, is good from an epistemic
perspective, as long as there is a balance in the number of followers of each leader.
However, if one opinion leader dominates and inﬂuences more voters, the probability of
correct decisions deteriorates quickly.
One important practical challenge for Populism remains even if no problems of
dependence arise: how do the judges know what the majority of voters think? Since it is
largely unfeasible (certainly unusual) to have referendums on matters of legal doctrine,
this ‘epistemic bottleneck’ is not a trivial problem.44 Popular majorities can often be tight
and hard to judge from any small and almost inevitably biased sample of people with
whom any given judge is likely to interact. Even if a judge were able to draw an unbiased
sample (i.e. not just talking to his friends, neighbours and colleagues), taking a small
sample can substantially undercut the main mechanism by which Populism produces the
good epistemic effects that it does, by drawing on a large population.
CONCLUSION
The independence assumption of the CJT has long been identiﬁed as a highly problematic
supposition. Sunstein’s use of the CJT framework to compare Traditionalism,
Cosmopolitanism and Populism calls for an analysis of different mechanisms that undermine
independence. In the case of Traditionalism and Cosmopolitanism, the sequential voting
process causes problems because later judges will change their vote in the light of earlier
opinions. In the case of Populism, a problem with independence arises particularly when
opinion leaders inﬂuence voters, a scenario that is all too common in politics.
Populism is attractive, probably more attractive than Traditionalism, because it
includes many voters and avoids the problem of sequential voting. Given the right
constellation, opinion leaders do not too badly reduce the epistemic performance of the
population. From this perspective of ‘truth tracking’, Sunstein’s preference for
Traditionalism is questionable. If one wants to argue for Traditionalism on epistemic
grounds, one needs to provide arguments about how the problems arising from sequential
voting can be avoided. The two canvassed here both essentially amount to abandoning
Traditionalism in important respects.
43 For another analysis of why negatively correlated opinion leaders might be good from an epistemic
point of view, see Lu Hong and Scott Page, ‘Interpreted and Generated Signals’, Journal of Economic
Theory, 144 (2009), 2174–96.
44 Vermeule, Law and the Limits of Reason.
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